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0.	  Introduction	  	  
As	   has	   often	   been	   observed,	   numerous	   language	   games	   introduced	   by	   Wittgenstein	  
make	  reference	  to	  music	  and,	  more	  specifically,	  to	  musical	  understanding.	  The	  analogy	  
between	  music	  and	  language	  takes	  shape	  against	  this	  backdrop.	  In	  this	  case,	  as	  in	  other	  
cases	  –	  and	  for	  reasons	  that	  can	  be	  attributed	  to	  his	  way	  of	  conceiving	  the	  philosophical	  
practice	  –	  the	  examples	  are	  presented	  as	  a	  springboard	  for	  reflection:	  they	  confront	  us	  
with	  errors	  and	  conceptual	  traps,	  and	  they	  incite	  us	  to	  find	  a	  way	  out.	  But	  in	  what	  way	  
did	  Wittgenstein	  make	  use	  of	  language	  games	  in	  order	  to	  interrogate	  certain	  simple	  mu-­‐
sical	  morphologies?	  To	  what	  measure	  is	  this	  a	  fruitful	  exercise	  when	  we	  wish	  to	  clarify	  
our	  ways	  of	  understanding	  music?	  How	  is	  the	  nexus	  between	  musical	  understanding	  and	  
language	  games	  ultimately	  defined?	  In	  this	  study,	  we	  will	  attempt	  to	  draw	  an	  answer	  to	  
these	  questions	  by	  closely	  examining	  his	  text	  as	  well	  as	  by	  using	  certain	  examples.	  
1.	  Functions	  of	  Language	  Games	  
The	  aspects	  of	  the	  notion	  of	  «language	  games»	  emphasized	  by	  Wittgenstein	  vary	  in	  rela-­‐
tion	  to	  the	  evolution	  of	  his	  reflections.	  We	  can	  consider	   it	  as	  concept	   intended	  to	  sug-­‐
gest	  primitive	  forms	  of	  language	  that	  are	  useful	  for	  clarifying	  the	  more	  complex	  stratifi-­‐
cations	  of	  daily	  speech,	  but	  also,	  according	  to	  the	  Brown	  book,	  as	  an	  instrument	  that	  is	  
more	   generally	   intended	   to	   explore	   the	   processes	   of	   signification.	   Let	   us	   recall	   some	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principal	  objectives,	  using	  the	  clear	  interpretation	  of	  Joachim	  Schulte	  (1992)	  as	  our	  ba-­‐
sis.	  The	  following	  are	  the	  key	  concepts:	  
-­‐	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  necessity,	  in	  order	  to	  understand	  the	  meaning	  of	  an	  utterance,	  of	  
considering	  the	  context	  in	  which	  it	  is	  formulated;	  
-­‐	  to	  point	  out	  the	  importance	  of	  following	  certain	  rules,	  with	  the	  same	  objective;	  	  
-­‐	  to	  shed	  light	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  former	  two	  points	  are	  learned	  through	  a	  process	  of	  
learning;	  
-­‐	   to	   demonstrate	   that,	   ultimately,	   understanding	   language	   is	   inseparable	   from	   under-­‐
standing	  the	  activities	  that	  surround	  it.	  
All	  of	  these	  points	  are	  relevant,	  but	  the	  last	  two	  in	  particular	  substantiate	  the	  origi-­‐
nality	   of	   the	   point	   of	   view	   maintained	   in	   the	   Philosophical	   Investigations.	   Language	  
games	  lead	  us	  to	  recognize	  the	  illusoriness	  of	  the	  attempt	  to	  understand	  the	  meaning	  of	  
an	   expression	  without	   entering	   into	   the	   actual	   practice	   in	  which	   it	   is	   introduced.	   Lan-­‐
guage	  functions	  as	  other	  human	  activities	  that	  are	  founded	  on	  rules,	  and	  the	  example	  of	  
the	  game	   is	  effective	  because	   it	  demonstrates	   that	   in	  order	   to	  obtain	  a	   result	   it	   is	  not	  
enough	  to	  simply	  start	  from	  theoretical	  knowledge:	  a	  guided	  and	  progressively	  perfect-­‐
ed	  practice	  is	  needed.	  We	  learn	  to	  play	  by	  imitating,	  repeating,	  consolidating,	  correcting	  
and	  adapting	  our	  behavior	  to	  new	  situations.	  This	  is	  what	  happens	  when	  we	  play	  a	  mu-­‐
sical	  instrument:	  as	  useful	  as	  the	  study	  of	  theory	  can	  be,	  we	  cannot	  prescind	  from	  a	  spe-­‐
cific	   training	   founded	  on	  the	  assimilation	  of	  muscular,	  nervous	  and	  perceptive	  compe-­‐
tencies.	  Surely	   it	   is	  no	  coincidence	  that	   in	  many	   languages	  (such	  as	   in	  English,	  German	  
and	   French)	   the	   Italian	   “suonare”	   and	   “giocare”	   are	   two	  meanings	  of	   the	   same	  word:	  
the	  playing	  of	  an	  instrument	  is	  a	  good	  example	  of	  an	  activity	  that	  is	  based	  on	  rules.	  	  
The	  fact	  that	  this	  holds	  true	  for	  playing	  an	  instrument	  might	  seem	  obvious;	  yet	   it	   is	  
not	  as	  apparent	  when	  we	  try	  to	  understand	  the	  meaning	  of	  a	  sentence,	  and	  it	  is	  perhaps	  
this	  lesser	  patency	  that	  characterizes	  the	  originality	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  point	  of	  view.	  The	  
term	  «language	  game»	  must	  imply	  that	  «the	  speaking	  of	  language	  is	  part	  of	  an	  activity,	  
or	  of	  a	  form	  of	  life»	  (Wittgenstein	  [1953]:	  §23	  (Wittgenstein	  [2009]:	  15)).	  This	  intention	  
also	  highlights	   the	  main	  objective	  of	  a	  good	  portion	  of	   language	  games	   that	  deal	  with	  
music:	  clarifying	  the	  notions	  of	  meaning	  and	  of	  understanding	  of	  a	   linguistic	  utterance	  
(even	  if,	  as	  Schulte	  observed,	  we	  are	  able	  to	  distinguish	  an	  underlying	  instrument	  that	  is	  
related	  more	  generally	   to	   the	   task	  Wittgenstein	  attributed	   to	  philosophy).	  We	  can	  say	  
that	  the	  direction	  of	  these	  observations	  moves	  from	  music	  to	  language.	  Is	  it	  possible	  to	  
invert	  the	  direction	  of	  this	  vector	  and	  to	  affirm	  that	  they	  also	  clarify	  musical	  understand-­‐
ing?	  In	  our	  judgment,	  and	  in	  confirmation	  of	  what	  has	  been	  pointed	  out	  by	  other	  schol-­‐
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ars	  (see,	  for	  example,	  the	  keen	  observations	  of	  Ridley	  [2004]:	  22-­‐41,	  and	  Scruton	  [2009]:	  
33-­‐42),	  it	  is.	  Nevertheless,	  it	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  understanding	  how	  to	  carry	  out	  this	  inversion	  
without	  running	  risks,	  that	  is,	  without	  finding	  ourselves	  trapped	  in	  new	  conceptual	  cag-­‐
es.	  	  
2.	  The	  Grammar	  of	  Musical	  Discourse	  
Analyzing	  language	  games	  allows	  us,	  first	  and	  foremost,	  to	  clarify	  the	  ways	  we	  speak	  of	  
music	  –	  that	  is,	  the	  way	  we	  conceive	  of	  it,	  as	  I	  believe	  can	  be	  said	  without	  having	  to	  nec-­‐
essarily	   postulate	   an	   identity	   between	   thought	   and	   language.	  Many	   of	  Wittgenstein’s	  
observations	   invite	   us	   to	   subject	   musical	   terminology	   to	   a	   careful	   examination.	   The	  
meanings	  of	  terms	  such	  as	  “melody”,	  “expression”,	  “tempo”	  and	  “perception”	  vary	  ac-­‐
cording	  to	  the	  context:	  being	  aware	  of	  the	  game	  they	  are	  part	  of	  is	  useful	  in	  order	  for	  us	  
not	   to	   commit	   errors	   of	   judgment.	   Accordingly,	   attempting	   to	   describe	   a	   melody	   by	  
Schubert	  (Wittgenstein	  [1998]:	  54)	  can	  lead	  us	  to	  reflect	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  this	  term	  does	  
not	  have	   the	  exact	   same	   function	  when	  applied	   to	  another	  composer.	  Meaning	  varies	  
additionally,	  we	  might	   add	  by	   following	   the	   suggestions	   in	   the	   Lectures	   on	  Aesthetics,	  
when	  it	  is	  used	  to	  describe	  or	  to	  assess	  (as	  with	  certain	  adjectives	  that	  indicate	  dynamic	  
and	  expressive	  aspects:	  “graceful”,	   for	   instance).	   In	   the	   first	  game	  we	  could	  say	   that	  a	  
melody	  has	  eight	  bars	  and	  in	  the	  second	  that	  a	  composer	  lacks	  melody	  –	  we	  might	  think	  
of	  Nietzsche’s	   famous	   criticism	  of	  Wagner’s	   Leitmotif.	   And	   still:	   the	   game	  of	   technical	  
description	  does	  not	  (always)	  coincide	  with	  the	  game	  of	  aesthetic	  or	  expressive	  descrip-­‐
tion	  (that	  which	  in	  the	  latter	  is	  a	  melody,	  could	  simply	  be	  a	  motive,	  a	  phrase,	  a	  period	  or	  
a	  theme	  in	  the	  former).	  	  
Another	   example:	  when	  we	   say	   that	  we	  perceive	   the	   “solemnity”	   of	   a	  melody,	  we	  
must	  be	  aware	  that	  what	  we	  perceive	  cannot	  be	  communicated	  by	  simply	  reproducing	  
what	  we	  heard	  (Wittgenstein	  [1953]:	  §233	  (Wittgenstein	  [2009]:	  221)).	  Little	   is	  needed	  
to	  show	  that,	  when	  dealing	  with	  musical	  content,	  the	  terms	  relative	  to	  perception	  must	  
be	  understood	  as	  being	   in	   reference	   to	  a	  perception	   that	   is	  not	  purely	   sensory	   (when	  
expounding	  the	  analyses	  of	  the	  second	  part	  of	  the	  Philosophical	  Investigations,	  scholars	  
today	   usually	   define	   it	   as	   «aspectual	   perception»).	   Already	   in	   a	   passage	   from	   the	  Big	  
Typescript	  (Wittgenstein	  [2005]:	  321)	  we	  are	  invited	  to	  compare	  two	  phrases	  such	  as	  «I	  
hear	  the	  music	  clearly»	  and	  «I	  hear	  the	  ringing	  in	  my	  ears	  clearly»,	  leading	  us	  to	  reflect	  
on	  the	  use	  of	  physical	  terms	  applied	  to	  sense	  data.	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Yet	   another	   example:	  when	   explaining	  what	   it	  means	   to	   perform	   a	   song	   “with	   ex-­‐
pression”	  we	  can	  surmise	  that	  this	  falls	  under	  things	  that	  are	  done	  («first	  you	  perform	  
the	  song,	  then	  you	  add	  expression	  to	  it»).	  But	  if	  this	  way	  of	  thinking	  were	  accurate,	  ac-­‐
cording	  to	  Wittgenstein,	  then	  we	  should	  be	  able	  to	  reproduce	  alone	  not	  only	  the	  melo-­‐
dy,	  but	  also	  its	  expression	  (Wittgenstein	  [1953]:	  §332	  (Wittgenstein	  [2009]:	  114)).	  If	  this	  
appears	  odd,	   it	   is	  because	  musical	  expression	  would	  not	  be	  understood	  as	  an	  element	  
that	   is	   added	   to	   others,	   but	   rather	   as	   the	   result	   of	   a	   certain	   arrangement	   of	   the	   ele-­‐
ments	  under	  observation.	  This	  also	  illustrates	  the	  difficulties	  of	  the	  theory	  that	  expres-­‐
sion	  in	  music	  coincides	  with	  the	  sensations	  that	  it	  transmits	  to	  us.	  An	  intransitive	  use	  of	  
the	  term	  arises,	  instead,	  in	  reference	  to	  the	  manner	  of	  performing:	  «I	  can	  talk	  about	  the	  
expression	  with	  which	   someone	  plays	  a	  passage	  without	   thinking	   that	  a	  different	  pas-­‐
sage	   might	   have	   the	   same	   expression.	   Here	   this	   concept	   serves	   only	   as	   a	   means	   for	  
comparing	  different	  performances	  of	  this	  passage»	  (Wittgenstein	  [1982]:	  §382,	  52).	  	  
3.	  Musical	  Understanding	  and	  Verbal	  Understanding	  	  
The	  objective	  of	   the	  strategy	  that	  we	  have	   illustrated	  consists	  of	  clarifying	  the	  ways	   in	  
which	  we	  speak	  of	  music	  or	  our	  experience	  of	  it.	  Let	  us	  now	  move	  forward	  and	  try	  to	  de-­‐
termine	   if	   the	   language	   games	   introduced	   by	  Wittgenstein	   can	   help	   us	   elucidate	   our	  
ways	  of	  perceiving	   it	  and	  of	  understanding	   it.	  As	  we	  have	  already	  mentioned,	  a	  signifi-­‐
cant	   number	   of	   annotations	   concentrate	   on	   the	   confrontation	   between	   verbal	   under-­‐
standing	  and	  musical	  understanding.	  How	  should	  we	  take	  this	  comparison?	  First	  off,	  we	  
must	  remember	  that	  Wittgenstein	  took	  heed	  primarily	  to	  the	  parallel	  between	  the	  un-­‐
derstanding	  of	  a	  musical	  theme	  (in	  view	  of	  his	  preferences	  and	  his	  examples,	  we	  might	  
think	  of	   the	  melodic	  profile	  of	  a	   thematic	  group	   from	  a	  composition	  of	  Wienerklassik)	  
and	  the	  understanding	  of	  a	  sentence.	  Already	   in	  the	  Tractatus	   it	   is	  acknowledged	  that,	  
just	  as	  a	  musical	  theme,	  a	  proposition	  is	  «articulate»	  (Wittgenstein	  [1922]:	  §3.141	  (Witt-­‐
genstein	  [2001]:	  14)).	  But	  a	  musical	  object	  can	  coincide	  with	  different	  units	  or	  aspects.	  
For	  example,	  a	  passage	  from	  the	  Philosophical	  Investigations	  (inspired	  by	  a	  reflection	  in	  
the	  Big	   Typescript	   (Wittgenstein	   [2005]:	   322)),	   invites	   us	   to	   ask	   ourselves	   «What	   hap-­‐
pens	  when	  we	  learn	  to	  feel	  the	  ending	  of	  a	  church	  mode	  as	  an	  ending?»	  (Wittgenstein	  
[1953]:	  §535	  (Wittgenstein	  [2009]:	  152)).	  In	  the	  Brown	  Book,	  Wittgenstein	  invites	  us	  to	  
reflect	  on	  a	  simple	  piece	  of	  advice	  given	  to	  a	  performer:	  «Tell	  yourself	  that	  it’s	  a	  waltz,	  
and	  you	  will	  play	  it	  correctly»	  (Wittgenstein	  [1958]:	  167).	  In	  his	  Remarks	  on	  Philosophi-­‐
Alessandro	  Arbo,	  Language	  Games	  and	  Musical	  Understanding	  
pag.	  191	  
©	  Firenze	  University	  Press	  •	  Aisthesis	  •	  1/2013	  •	  www.fupress.com/aisthesis	  •	  ISSN	  2035-­‐8466 
cal	   Psychology	   (Wittgenstein	   [1980]	   (Wittgenstein	   [1980]:	   §247)),	   he	   proposes	   to	   sug-­‐
gest	  the	  meaning	  of	  an	  «answer»	  of	  a	  musical	  passage	  by	  a	  gesture.	  	  
These	  invitations	  bring	  to	  light	  various	  aspects	  of	  a	  single	  problem:	  explaining	  the	  ex-­‐
perience	  of	  signification.	  The	  most	   important	   is	  probably	  that	  which	  assumes	  the	  form	  
of	  «hearing	  as»	  –	  parallel	  and	  complementary	  to	  the	  «playing	  as»:	  a	  game	  that	  actually	  
has	  multiple	   functions	   and	   that	   is	   found,	  more	  or	   less	   explicitly,	   in	   the	  majority	   of	   in-­‐
stances	  in	  which	  Wittgenstein	  spoke	  of	  music	  and,	  in	  particular,	  of	  the	  way	  in	  which	  we	  
are	  able	  to	  comprehend	  the	  design,	  the	  syntax	  or	  the	  expression	  of	  musical	  entities	  of	  
various	  natures:	   from	  a	  phrase	   (or	   a	   theme),	   to	   an	   introduction,	   to	   a	   conclusion,	   to	   a	  
waltz.	  In	  sum,	  its	  functions	  can	  be	  summarized	  as	  follows:	  	  
-­‐	   it	   highlights	   the	   opportunity	   to	   conceive	   the	   perception	   /	   understanding	   of	  music	   in	  
terms	  of	  aspectual	  perception;	  
-­‐	   it	   solicits	  and	  makes	  easier	   the	  perception	  of	  aspects,	   inducing	   in	   this	  way	  a	  musical	  
understanding;	  
-­‐	  it	  allows	  us	  to	  check	  the	  musical	  understanding	  of	  which	  a	  listener	  (another	  person)	  is	  
capable;	  
-­‐	  it	  helps	  us	  to	  test	  musical	  ambiguities.	  
We	  will	   not	   dwell	   on	   these	   points,	   which	   have	   already	   been	   illustrated	   elsewhere	  
(Arbo	  [2012]).	  In	  order	  to	  better	  grasp	  the	  meaning	  of	  these	  questions,	  we	  will	   instead	  
turn	  to	  a	  broader	  section	  of	  the	  above-­‐quoted	  passage	  from	  the	  Brown	  Book.	  Based	  on	  
an	  ordinary	  situation	  of	  apparition	  of	  an	  aspect	  (particularly	  the	  case	  in	  which	  we	  retain	  
to	  have	  captured	  the	  expression	  of	  a	  face),	  Wittgenstein	  invites	  us	  to	  try	  to	  understand	  
what	  the	  «saying»	  of	  a	  melody	  consists	  of:	  
The	  same	  strange	  illusion	  which	  we	  are	  under	  when	  we	  seem	  to	  seek	  the	  something	  which	  a	  
face	   expresses	  whereas,	   in	   reality,	  we	   are	   giving	   ourselves	   up	   to	   the	   features	   before	   us	   –	  
that	  same	  illusion	  possesses	  us	  even	  more	  strongly	  if	  repeating	  a	  tune	  to	  ourselves	  and	  let-­‐
ting	  it	  make	  its	  full	  impression	  on	  us,	  we	  say	  “This	  tune	  says	  something”,	  and	  it	  is	  as	  though	  I	  
had	  to	  find	  what	  it	  says.	  And	  yet	  I	  know	  that	  it	  doesn't	  say	  anything	  such	  that	  I	  might	  express	  
in	  words	  or	  pictures	  what	  it	  says.	  And	  if,	  recognizing	  this,	  I	  resign	  myself	  to	  saying	  “It	  just	  ex-­‐
presses	   a	  musical	   thought”,	   this	  would	  mean	   no	  more	   than	   saying	   “It	   expresses	   itself”.	   –	  
“But	  surely	  when	  you	  play	  it	  you	  don’t	  play	  it	  anyhow,	  you	  play	  it	  in	  this	  particular	  way,	  mak-­‐
ing	   a	   crescendo	   here,	   a	   diminuendo	   there,	   a	   caesura	   in	   this	   place,	   etc.”	   –	   Precisely,	   and	  
that's	  all	  I	  can	  say	  about	  it,	  or	  may	  be	  all	  that	  I	  can	  say	  about	  it.	  For	  in	  certain	  cases	  I	  can	  jus-­‐
tify,	  explain	  the	  particular	  exp.ression	  with	  which	  I	  play	  it	  by	  a	  comparison,	  as	  when	  I	  say	  “At	  
this	  point	  of	  the	  theme,	  there	   is,	  as	   it	  were,	  a	  colon”,	  or	  “This	   is,	  as	   it	  were,	  the	  answer	  to	  
what	  came	  before”,	  etc.	  (This,	  by	  the	  way,	  shows	  what	  a	  ‘justification’	  and	  an	  ‘explanation’	  
in	  aesthetics	  is	  like.)	  It	  is	  true	  I	  may	  hear	  a	  tune	  played	  and	  say	  “This	  is	  not	  how	  it	  ought	  to	  be	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played,	   it	   goes	   like	   this”;	   and	   I	  whistle	   it	   in	   a	   different	   tempo.	  Here	  one	   is	   inclined	   to	   ask	  
“What	  is	  it	  like	  to	  know	  the	  tempo	  in	  which	  a	  piece	  of	  music	  should	  be	  played?”	  And	  the	  idea	  
suggests	  itself	  that	  there	  must	  be	  a	  paradigm	  somewhere	  in	  our	  mind,	  and	  that	  we	  have	  ad-­‐
justed	  the	  tempo	  to	  conform	  to	  that	  paradigm.	  But	  in	  most	  cases	  if	  someone	  asked	  me	  “How	  
do	  you	  think	  this	  melody	  should	  be	  played?”,	  I	  will,	  as	  an	  answer,	  just	  whistle	  it	  in	  a	  particu-­‐
lar	  way,	  and	  nothing	  will	  have	  been	  present	  to	  my	  mind	  but	  the	  tune	  actually	  whistled	  (not	  
an	  image	  of	  that).	  (Wittgenstein	  [1958]:	  §17,	  166).	  
Various	  commentators	  have	  focused	  on	  this	  passage	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  understand	  if	  
Wittgenstein’s	   position	   can	   be	   considered	   to	   be	   formalist	   or	   expressionist.	   Let	   us	   ob-­‐
serve	  the	  direction	  of	  the	  argument,	  which	  seems	  to	  lead	  our	  attention	  towards	  the	  fact	  
that	  in	  order	  to	  understand	  music	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  begin	  with	  an	  activity,	  or,	  more	  pre-­‐
cisely,	   by	   improving	   a	   performative	   act.	   Grasping	   the	  meaning	   of	   a	  melody	   ultimately	  
amounts	   to	  being	   able	   to	   convey	   it	   in	   a	   certain	  way	   (a	   crescendo	  here,	   a	  diminuendo	  
there,	  etc.).	  The	  way	  we	  play	   it,	  and	  even	  the	  way	  we	  whistle	   it	   (we	  should	  note	  Witt-­‐
genstein’s	  talent	  in	  this	  respect)	  suggests	  that	  we	  have	  been	  able	  to	  comprehend	  a	  cer-­‐
tain	  morphology	  —	  but	  also	  a	  certain	  rhythm	  («Tell	  yourself	  that	  it’s	  a	  waltz»).	  In	  other	  
texts,	  the	  object	  coincides	  with	  an	  aspect	  («You	  have	  to	  hear	  these	  bars	  as	  an	  introduc-­‐
tion»	  (Wittgenstein	  [1982]:	  §632,	  81))	  or,	  as	   in	  the	  Tractatus,	  an	  articulation;	  that	   is	  to	  
say,	  a	  syntactic	  connection.	  The	  crux	  of	  the	  question	  seems	  to	  reside	   in	  this	  point:	  un-­‐
derstanding,	  in	  music,	  amounts	  to	  grasping	  certain	  aspects.	  	  
Let	  us	  now	  focus	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  this	  is	  all	  demonstrated	  with	  reference	  to	  a	  unit	  of	  
small	  or	  medium	  proportions:	  it	  is	  in	  these	  proportions	  that	  we	  are	  able	  to	  comprehend	  
affinity	  through	  language.	  More	  precisely,	  what	  are	  the	  similarities	  that	  can	  be	  identified	  
at	   this	   level?	   If	  we	  review	  the	  examples	  proposed	  by	  Wittgenstein,	  we	  can	  summarize	  
them	  as	  follows:	  	  
-­‐	   if	  applied	  to	  a	  theme	  (be	  it	  verbal	  or	  musical)	  the	  concept	  of	  understanding	  oscillates	  
between	   the	   ability	   to	   paraphrase	   and	   the	   ability	   to	   seize	   the	   unicity	   or	   the	   non-­‐
paraphrasable	  essence	  of	  the	  object	   (in	  conformity	  with	  the	  more	  general	   idea	  of	  aes-­‐
thetic	  understanding);	  	  
-­‐	  a	  theme/sentence	  can	  be	  heard	  and	  comprehended,	  or	  heard	  without	  being	  compre-­‐
hended;	  
-­‐	  the	  understanding	  of	  a	  theme/sentence	  cannot	  be	  sufficiently	  realized	  without	  a	  clear	  
awareness	  of	  the	  context	  in	  which	  it	  is	  placed;	  
-­‐	  though	  different	  levels	  of	  understanding	  exist,	  it	  is	  manifested	  not	  as	  a	  process	  (a	  pro-­‐
gressive	  or	  cumulative	  formation),	  but	  rather	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  “click”	  (the	  sudden	  appari-­‐
tion	  of	  an	  aspect).	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Let	  us	  attempt	  to	  understand	  what	  consequences	  we	  can	  draw	  from	  these	  analogies.	  
We	  might	  begin	  by	  noting	  that	  if,	  as	  Wittgenstein	  observes	  in	  the	  conclusion	  of	  the	  cited	  
passage,	  it	   is	  true	  that	  both	  in	  the	  case	  of	  a	  musical	  theme	  and	  in	  that	  of	  a	  sentence	  it	  
can	  be	  said	  that	  «the	  content	  of	  the	  sentence	  is	  in	  the	  sentence»	  (Wittgenstein	  [1958]:	  
167),	  rather	  than	  in	  the	  identification	  of	  elements	  or	  references	  denoted	  by	  it,	  in	  reality	  
the	   idea	   of	   meaning	   corresponds,	   in	   both	   cases,	   to	   different	   uses.	   Understanding	   a	  
proposition,	  in	  some	  language	  games,	  simply	  amounts	  to	  extracting	  information:	  which	  
does	  not	  make	  sense,	  or	  at	  least	  is	  not	  what	  we	  usually	  do,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  a	  melody.	  In	  
pointing	  out	  this	  thought,	  we	  might	  observe,	  in	  accordance	  with	  an	  observation	  revisit-­‐
ed	   in	   the	  Philosophical	   Investigations,	   that	   at	   times	  we	   speak	  of	  understanding	  a	   sen-­‐
tence	   precisely	   «in	   the	   sense	   in	   which	   it	   can	   be	   replaced	   by	   another	   which	   says	   the	  
same;	  but	  also	  in	  the	  sense	  in	  which	  it	  cannot	  be	  replaced	  by	  any	  other.	  (Any	  more	  than	  
one	  musical	  theme	  can	  be	  replaced	  by	  another.)»	  (Wittgenstein	  [1953]:	  §531	  (Wittgen-­‐
stein	   [2009]:	  152)).	  Nevertheless,	   in	   these	  cases	  too,	  which	  are	  particularly	  highlighted	  
by	  poetic	   expression,	   it	   does	  not	   seem	  possible	   to	  prescind	   from	   the	  extraction	  of	   in-­‐
formation,	  as	  elementary	  as	  it	  may	  be:	  in	  order	  to	  understand	  a	  poem	  in	  English,	  surely	  I	  
must	  be	  able	  to	  comprehend	  how	  each	  word	  is	  irreplaceable;	  but	  I	  must	  also	  be	  able	  to	  
understand	  English,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  I	  must	  be	  able	  to	  know	  how	  to	  replace	  it	  with	  oth-­‐
er	  words	  (Wittgenstein	  [1967]:	  §17,	  6).	  At	  this	  point	  we	  might	  insist	  on	  competencies,	  as	  
Wittgenstein	  does	  in	  his	  Lectures	  on	  Aesthetics;	  but	  we	  should	  also	  emphasize	  that	  the	  
concept	  of	  aesthetic	  understanding	  cannot	  annul	  all	  forms	  of	  paraphrasing.	  	  
As	  demonstrated	  in	  a	  persuasive	  manner	  by	  Aaron	  Ridley	  ([2004]:	  35-­‐39),	  and	  as	  em-­‐
phasized	  in	  many	  semiotic	  analyses	  (particularly	  those	  founded	  on	  the	  identification	  of	  
specific	   topoi	   in	   the	  classical-­‐romantic	  or	  contemporary	  style),	   this	  certainly	  holds	   true	  
for	  music	  as	  well:	  not	  all	  of	  the	  content	  of	  a	  Sonata	  by	  Mozart	  or	  of	  a	  Concert	  by	  Vivaldi	  
or	  Bach	  is	  unique	  and	  irreplaceable,	  but	  it	  can	  be	  considered,	  at	  least	  in	  part,	  as	  generic	  
and	  replaceable	  (we	  might	  think	  of	  a	  harmonic	  sequence	  of	  transition,	  a	  progression,	  a	  
final	   cadence	   or	   other	   more	   or	   less	   “exportable”	   or	   “interchangeable”	   elements).	   It	  
would	  still	  be	  worth	  our	  while	  to	  point	  out	  that	  in	  our	  most	  common	  ways	  of	  “testing”	  
musical	   understanding,	   we	   do	   not	   turn	   to	   the	   way	   in	   which	   a	   musician	   or	   a	   listener	  
proves	  that	  they	  know	  how	  to	  “paraphrase”	  (musically)	  what	  they	  heard;	  rather,	  we	  try	  
to	  scrutinize	  their	  way	  of	  conveying	  what	  they	  heard,	  by	  following	  the	  most	  elementary	  
strategies	  suggested	  by	  Wittgenstein:	  we	  listen	  to	  determine	  if	  the	  phrasing	  is	  adequate	  
(in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  musician),	  or	  if	  the	  theme	  is	  efficiently	  “mimed”	  by	  a	  gesture,	  or	  cor-­‐
rectly	  whistled,	  or	  even	  conveyed	  by	  a	  facial	  expression,	  or	  suggested	  by	  the	  meaning	  of	  
Alessandro	  Arbo,	  Language	  Games	  and	  Musical	  Understanding	  
pag.	  194	  
©	  Firenze	  University	  Press	  •	  Aisthesis	  •	  1/2013	  •	  www.fupress.com/aisthesis	  •	  ISSN	  2035-­‐8466 
a	  phrase	  that	  could	  count,	  in	  certain	  cases,	  as	  a	  sort	  of	  “verbal	  counterpoint”.	  Ultimate-­‐
ly,	  it	  is	  essential	  that	  the	  ability	  to	  produce	  an	  analogous	  mode	  of	  expression	  is	  proven.	  	  
4.	  Language	  Games	  and	  Music	  Games	  
It	  is	  in	  this	  sense	  that	  musical	  understanding	  works	  as	  other	  genres	  of	  aesthetic	  under-­‐
standing:	  it	  does	  not	  involve	  a	  «know	  that»	  but	  rather	  a	  «know	  how».	  It	  is	  not	  founded	  
on	  the	  transmission	  of	  content	  but	  rather	  it	  mobilizes	  our	  abilities	  to	  grasp	  expressions	  
and	  aspects.	  This	  is	  why,	  in	  testing	  the	  musical	  comprehension	  of	  a	  listener,	  we	  do	  not	  
tend	  to	  make	  reference	  to	  contents	  of	  meaning	  that	  are	  somehow	  separable	  from	  what	  
he	  heard	  (“did	  you	  understand	  what	  the	  hero	  did	  by	  listening	  to	  this	  symphony?”).	  We	  
are,	   instead,	   interested	   in	  knowing	   if	  he	  understood	  the	  specific	  mode	  of	  presentation	  
and	  articulation	  of	  what	  he	  heard	  (“what	  would	  you	  compare	  the	  evolution	  of	  this	  min-­‐
uet	   to?”).	  After	   reading	  Wittgenstein	  we	  can	  be	  easily	  convinced	  of	   the	   fact	   that	  even	  
the	  comprehension	  of	  language	  cannot	  be	  reduced	  to	  the	  first	  hypothesis;	  but	  the	  fact	  
remains	  that	  it	  also	  involves	  this	  possibility.	  	  
The	  second	  difference	  consists	   in	  the	  fact	  that,	  as	  can	  be	   inferred	  from	  many	  other	  
reflections	  made	  by	  Wittgenstein,	  musical	  understanding	  depends	  on	  a	  perception	  that	  
is	  enriched	  with	  cognitive	  elements,	  but	  nevertheless	  never	  entirely	  separable	  from	  sen-­‐
sory	  components.	  Here,	  too,	  the	  comparison	  with	  language	  can	  only	  be	  used	  up	  to	  a	  cer-­‐
tain	  point.	  While	  the	  example	  of	  the	  poem	  appears	  relevant	  (Wittgenstein	  [1953]:	  §531	  
(Wittgenstein	  [2009]:	  152)),	  there	  are	  still	  differences:	  reading	  a	  poem	  without	  hearing	  
or	  imagining	  the	  sounds	  to	  which	  the	  printed	  letters	  correspond	  would	  surely	  be	  of	  little	  
gratification	  and	  reductive,	  yet	  it	  is	  still	  possible;	  reading	  a	  musical	  score	  without	  imagin-­‐
ing	  the	  sounds	  to	  which	  the	  notes	  correspond	  simply	  amounts	  to	  not	  reading	  it	  (admit-­‐
tedly,	  the	  theories	  regarding	  this	  point	  are	  conflicting;	  but	  we	  could	  be	   led,	  along	  with	  
Dahlhaus	  [1986],	  to	  think	  that	  even	  the	  silent	  reading	  of	  a	  musical	  score	  corresponds	  to	  
a	  sort	  of	  execution	  –	  at	  least	  if	  it	  has	  the	  ambition	  to	  present	  itself	  as	  a	  comprehension	  
of	  the	  work:	  if,	  for	  example,	  we	  are	  not	  able	  to	  imagine	  how	  a	  certain	  harmonic	  progres-­‐
sion	  might	  sound	  while	  we	  read,	  what	  can	  we	  claim	  to	  have	  comprehended	  on	  the	  mu-­‐
sical	  plane?).	  	  
Despite	  the	  fact	  that	  musical	  understanding	  exhibits	  numerous	  similarities	  to	  the	  un-­‐
derstanding	  of	   language,	   it	  would	  be	  wrong	  to	  claim	  a	  resemblance	  founded	  on	  an	  es-­‐
sential	  “linguisticity”	  of	  music.	  An	  aspect	  that	  is	  worth	  insisting	  upon	  when	  considering	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the	  nexus	  between	  language	  games	  and	  musical	  understanding	  is	  the	  meaning	  that	  can	  
be	  identified	  in	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  game.	  Let	  us	  see	  how.	  	  
We	  have	  already	  observed	  –	  and	   the	  annotations	   in	   the	  Brown	  Book	  and	   in	   the	  Big	  
Typescript	  clearly	  point	  out	  –	  that	  in	  order	  to	  understand	  a	  musical	  object	  –	  or	  in	  order	  
to	  try	  to	  make	  someone	  understand	  it	  –	  a	  certain	  training	  is	  necessary:	  we	  must	  be	  able	  
to	  experience	  a	   conclusion	  as	  a	   conclusion,	   a	  phrase	  as	  articulated	  with	   two	  points,	   a	  
song	  as	  a	  waltz,	  etc.	  Now,	   it	   is	  clear	   that	   in	  order	   to	  successfully	  perform	  this	   task	  we	  
must	  master	  the	  linguistic	  procedures	  that	  we	  are	  referring	  to.	  But	  it	  is	  also	  true	  that	  this	  
practice,	  in	  and	  of	  itself,	  is	  not	  enough:	  I	  can	  very	  well	  know	  what	  a	  conclusion	  or	  an	  in-­‐
troduction	  is,	  but	  still	  not	  be	  able	  to	  hear	  it	  (to	  hear	  the	  musical	  conclusion).	  This	  is	  why,	  
in	  an	  attempt	  to	  convey	  the	  thought	  of	  Wittgenstein	  with	  terms	  that	  he	  did	  not	  use	  –	  we	  
must	  emphasize	  this	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  any	  misunderstanding	  –	  we	  can	  be	  lead	  to	  assert	  
that	  understanding	  music	  amounts	  to	  entering	  the	  orbit	  of	  music	  games	   that	  exhibit	  a	  
relative	  operational	  autonomy.	  	  
But	  why	  speak	  of	  games?	  The	  answer	  most	  likely	  has	  to	  do	  with	  the	  anthropological	  
bases	   in	  which	  every	  musical	  activity	  plants	   its	   roots	   (as	  highlighted	  by	  Molino	   [2009];	  
moreover,	  this	  holds	  true	  for	  every	  activity	  in	  which	  we	  develop	  an	  aesthetic	  attitude,	  as	  
has	  been	  argued	  by	  various	  philosophical	  perspectives	   in	   reworking	  a	  Schillerian	   intui-­‐
tion;	  see	  for	  example	  Gadamer	  [1960]	  (Gadamer	  [2004])	  and	  Desideri	  [2011]).	  But	  there	  
is	   still	   another	   way	   to	   answer	   the	   question:	   because	   one	   of	   the	  main	   aspects	   of	   the	  
meaning	  of	  this	  notion	  (brought	  to	  light	  by	  Wittgenstein)	  still	  occupies	  a	  preeminent	  po-­‐
sition.	  In	  order	  to	  understand	  music,	  both	  in	  playing	  it	  and	  in	  listening	  to	  it,	   it	   is	  neces-­‐
sary	  not	  only	  to	  know	  the	  rules,	  but	  also	  to	  be	  able	  to	  apply	  them	  or	  follow	  them.	  Surely	  
a	  music	  game	  is	  learned	  by	  playing	  it.	  Let	  us	  consider	  a	  very	  simple	  example:	  what	  does	  
it	  mean	  to	  comprehend	  a	  deceiving	  cadence?	  Its	  presence	  must	  be	  felt	  by	  ear,	  not	  (only)	  
on	  paper.	  Clearly	  it	  is	  also	  necessary	  to	  understand	  its	  function,	  the	  role	  that	  it	  can	  play	  
in	  a	   certain	   song	  or	  musical	   style	   (such	  as	   in	   the	   coded	  writing	  of	  basso	   continuo).	   Its	  
surprising	  nature	  can	  be	   illustrated	   in	  an	  elementary	  manner,	  beginning	  with	  the	  com-­‐
parison	  to	  another	  situation	  that	  can	  be	  considered	  its	  alternative,	  that	  of	  authentic	  ca-­‐
dence:	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Despite the fact that musical understanding exhibits numerous similarities to the understand-
ing of language, it would be wrong to claim a resemblance founded on an essential “linguis-
ticity” of music. An aspect that is worth insisting upon when considering the nexus between 
language games and musical understanding is the meaning that can be identified in the notion 
of a game. Let us see how.  
We have already observed – and the annotations in the Brown Book and in the Big Typescript 
clearly point out – that in order to understand a musical object – or in order to try to make 
someone understand it – a certain training is necessary: we must be able to experience a con-
clusion as a conclusion, a phrase as articulated with two points, a song as a waltz, etc. Now, 
it is clear that in order to successfully perform this task we must master the linguistic proce-
dures that we are referring to. But it is also true that this practice, in and of itself, is not 
enough: I can very well know what a conclusion or an introduction is, but still not be able to 
hear it (to hear the musical conclusion). This is why, in an attempt to convey the thought of 
Wittgenstein with terms that he did not use – we must emphasize this in order to avoid any 
misunderstanding – we can be lead to assert that understanding music amounts to entering the 
orbit of music games that exhibit a relative operational autonomy.  
But why speak of games? The answer most likely has to do with the anthropological bases in 
which every musical activity plants its roots (as highlighted by Molino [2009]; moreover, this 
holds true for every activity in which we develop an aesthetic attitude, as has been argued by 
various philosophical perspectives in reworking a Schillerian intuition; see for example Gad-
amer [1960] (Gadamer [2004]) and Desideri [2011]). But there is still another way to answer 
the question: because one of the main aspects of the meaning of this notion (brought to light 
by Wittgenstein) still occupies a preeminent position. In order to understand music, both in 
playing it and in listening to it, it is necessary not only to know the rules, but also to be able to 
apply them or follow them. Surely a music game is learned by playing it. Let us consider a 
very simple example: what does it mean to comprehend a deceiving cadence? Its presence 
must be felt by ear, not (only) on paper. Clearly it is also necessary to understand its function, 
the role that it can play in a certain song or musical style (such as in the coded writing of bas-
so continuo). Its surprising nature can be illustrated in an elementary manner, beginning with 





But surely the surprise can be more or less evident, depending on the harmonic and stylistic 
contexts. In a Sonata by Corelli, for example, it can seem weakened by the impression that it 
simply wishes to prolong the discourse (a function upon which various levels of expressive 
and symbolic meaning can expand). The harmonic rules that preside over a composition by 
Schubert are not very different: and yet the same solution often sees an increase in the sur-
prise effect. We are close, I believe, to what Wittgenstein called a «move» within a language 
game. But, clearly, it is an elementary move, and other situations can demonstrate more subtle 
differences (the aforementioned difference between the melody of Schubert and that of Mo-
zart is one example of this).  
	  
But	  surely	  the	  surprise	  can	  be	  more	  or	  less	  evident,	  depending	  on	  the	  harmonic	  and	  
stylistic	  contexts.	  In	  a	  Sonata	  by	  Corelli,	  for	  example,	  it	  can	  seem	  weakened	  by	  the	  im-­‐
pression	  that	   it	  simply	  wishes	  to	  prolong	  the	  discourse	  (a	   function	  upon	  which	  various	  
levels	  of	  expressive	  and	  symbolic	  meaning	  can	  expand).	  The	  harmonic	  rules	  that	  preside	  
over	  a	  composition	  by	  Schubert	  are	  not	  very	  different:	  and	  yet	  the	  same	  solution	  often	  
sees	   an	   increase	   in	   the	   surprise	   effect.	  We	   are	   close,	   I	   believe,	   to	   what	  Wittgenstein	  
called	   a	   «move»	  within	   a	   language	   game.	   But,	   clearly,	   it	   is	   an	   elementary	  move,	   and	  
other	   situations	   can	  demonstrate	  more	   subtle	   differences	   (the	   aforementioned	  differ-­‐
ence	  between	  the	  melody	  of	  Schubert	  and	  that	  of	  Mozart	  is	  one	  example	  of	  this).	  	  
It	   could	   be	   said	   that	   not	   all	  musical	   situations	   can	   be	   traced	   back	   to	   defined	   rules	  
such	  as	  those	  that	  preside	  over	  the	  composition	  of	  musical	  themes	  referred	  to	  by	  Witt-­‐
genstein	  (who	  especially	  loved	  Mozart	  and	  Beethoven).	  We	  might	  reply,	  however,	  that,	  
as	  poorly	  defined	  as	  they	  can	  be,	  some	  rules	  are	  always	  present	  when	  there	  is	  a	  musical	  
experience,	  as	   revolutionary	  or	   transgressive	  as	   it	  may	  seem.	  When	  Cage	   invited	  us	   to	  
listen	  to	  the	  silence	  in	  4’33”	  was	  he	  not	  proposing	  that	  we	  respect	  a	  rule?	  And	  weren’t	  
many	  others	  implied?	  (continuing	  to	  listen,	  applauding	  or	  whistling	  especially	  at	  the	  end,	  
etc.).	  Does	  the	  improvisation	  of	  a	  jam	  session	  not	  impose	  the	  rule	  to	  scrutinize	  the	  musi-­‐
cians’	  ability	  to	  avoid	  solutions	  that	  are	  considered	  to	  be	  conventional,	  repetitive	  or	  ba-­‐
nal?	  Moreover,	  no	  one	  has	  ever	  asserted	  that	  the	  rules	  of	  a	  game	  define	  all	  that	  we	  can	  
do	  with	  it	  or	  in	  it:	  like	  all	  games	  (we	  are	  reminded	  by	  Wittgenstein	  [1953]:	  §68	  (Wittgen-­‐
stein	  [2009]:	  37)),	  music	  games	  are	  only	  partially	  founded	  on	  rules.	  	  
We	  could	  be	  tempted	  into	  concluding	  that	  there	  is	  not	  much	  of	  a	  difference	  between	  
this	  type	  of	  game	  and	  language	  games:	  they	  are	  both	  games	  and	  surely	  they	  exhibit	  cer-­‐
tain	  family	  resemblances.	  But	  we	  must	  emphasize	  that	  this	  resemblance	  is	  not	  an	  identi-­‐
ty.	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  mastery	  of	  a	  music	  game	  (by	  a	  musician	  or	  by	  a	  listener)	  is	  
only	  rarely	  accompanied	  by	  a	  similar	  mastery	  of	  the	  language	  games	  that	  accompany	  it.	  
And	  the	  opposite	  can	  be	  true:	  the	  ability	  to	  describe	  or	  judge	  a	  musical	  piece	  can	  easily	  
be	  accompanied	  by	  a	  mediocre	  performative	  ability.	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5.	  Musical	  Understandings	  
Another	  observation	  must	  be	  made	  so	  as	  to	  avoid	  any	  misunderstandings.	  We	  have	  re-­‐
mained	  faithful	  in	  a	  certain	  sense	  to	  Wittgenstein’s	  way	  of	  expressing	  himself	  as	  our	  dis-­‐
cussion	  has	  unfolded	  in	  speaking	  of	  musical	  understanding	  as	  a	  relatively	  homogeneous	  
concept	  (though	  divided,	  so	  to	  speak,	  between	  the	  opposite	  extremes	  of	  paraphrasabil-­‐
ity	  and	  non-­‐paraphrasability,	  as	  pointed	  out	  by	  Ridley	  [2004]	  and	  Soulez	  [2012]:	  76-­‐78).	  
In	  reality,	  not	  only	  are	  there	  different	  uses	  of	  “understanding”	  but	  there	  are	  also	  differ-­‐
ent	  objects	  and	  different	  forms	  of	  understanding,	  so	  to	  speak.	  It	   is	  one	  thing	  to	  under-­‐
stand	   a	  musical	   phrase,	   but	   it	   is	   another	   to	   understand	   a	  musical	   work	   or	   one	   of	   its	  
parts.	  It	  is	  reasonable	  to	  think	  that	  the	  knowledge	  and	  the	  games	  that	  we	  are	  referring	  
to	  can	  have	  common	  aspects;	  but,	  once	  again,	  this	  similarity	  does	  not	  suggest	  that	  we	  
can	   make	   generalizations	   without	   misconstructions.	   The	   comprehension	   of	   a	   musical	  
work	  –	  insofar	   as	   a	   musical	   work	  –	  demands	   knowledge	   and	   abilities	   that	   are	   not	   re-­‐
quired	   in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  comprehension	  of	  phrases:	   it	   is	  useful	  and	  even	  necessary	  to	  
know	  the	  title,	  the	  author,	  the	  context	  in	  which	  it	  was	  created,	  the	  genre,	  etc.	  (for	  more	  
on	  this	  sense	  of	  «hearing	  as»,	  see	  Arbo	  [2012]:	  122-­‐127).	  Over	  the	  past	  ten	  years,	  schol-­‐
ars	  have	  expounded	  extensively	  upon	  this	  topic,	  concentrating	  their	  studies	  on	  the	  anal-­‐
ysis	  of	  the	  criteria	  of	  the	  object’s	  identity.	  	  
Let	  us	  now	  turn	  to	  what	  we	  have	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  different	  forms	  of	  understanding.	  
Insofar	  as	  an	  aspectual	  perception,	  musical	  perception	  oscillates	  between	  one	  extreme,	  
where	  sensory	  elements	  are	  preeminent	  with	  respect	  to	  conceptual	  elements,	  and	  the	  
other	  extreme,	  where	  the	  situation	  is	  reversed	  (as	  illustrated	  by	  Darsel	  [2009]:	  203).	  In	  
order	  to	  recognize	  an	  expression	  of	  melancholy	  in	  a	  musical	  passage,	  we	  do	  not	  need	  to	  
know	  many	  things,	  nor	  do	  we	  need	  to	  know	  many	  rules	  (which	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  we	  
do	   not	   need	   to	   practice,	   but	   simply	   that	   this	   is	   not	   related	   to	   the	  mastery	   of	   certain	  
rules,	  as	  Wittgenstein	  had	  noted).	  But	  in	  order	  to	  recognize	  a	  Neopolitan	  sixth,	  it	  is	  clear	  
that	  we	  must	  also	  know	  what	  it	  is,	  where	  it	  is	  used,	  what	  its	  function	  is,	  etc.	  This	  should	  
lead	  us	  to	  pay	  heed	  to	  the	  context	  in	  which	  the	  idea	  of	  comprehension	  is	  introduced:	  to	  
the	  fact	  that	  it	  could	  refer	  to	  the	  ability	  to	  understand	  by	  acquaintance	  the	  relationship	  
between	  one	  moment	  and	  another	  (as	  in	  the	  basic	  musical	  understanding	  theorized	  by	  
Levinson	  [1997]),	  or	  to	  the	  comparison	  of	  broader	  sections;	  and	  even	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  
aspects	  in	  question	  can	  only	  be	  understood	  literally	  (as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  a	  Neopolitan	  sixth)	  
or	  metaphorically	  (as	  in	  the	  affective	  meaning	  of	  a	  melody).	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Finally,	  we	  must	  not	   forget	   that,	   insofar	  as	  aesthetic	  understanding,	  musical	  under-­‐
standing	  implies	  an	  ability	  to	  appreciate	  (an	  ability	  to	  select	  that	  which	  is	  compliant	  with	  
or	  not	  compliant	  with	  the	  rules,	  but	  also	  that	  which	  is	  expressively	  effective).	  This	  does	  
not	  authorize	  us	  to	  say	  that	  the	  former	  is	  necessarily	  accompanied	  by	  the	  formulation	  of	  
a	  judgment.	  We	  have	  already	  observed	  that	  many	  musicians	  are	  not	  able	  to	  express	  an	  
assessment	   of	   that	  which	  makes	   (their)	  music	   communicative	   or	   expressive.	   And,	   yet,	  
while	  we	   can	   say	   that,	   strictly	   speaking,	   an	   adequate	   (and	   sometimes	  even	  profound)	  
musical	  understanding	  does	  not	   involve	  an	  aesthetic	   judgment,	   it	   is	  also	  true	  that,	   in	  a	  
broader	  sense,	  said	  judgment	  constitutes	  not	  only	  one	  of	  the	  possible	  responses,	  but	  a	  
response	  that	  we	  generally	  consider	  to	  be	  among	  the	  most	  pertinent	  within	  the	  realm	  of	  
a	   musical	   culture.	   This	   strengthens	   the	   connection	   between	   comprehension	   and	   lan-­‐
guage	  games.	   In	  other	  words,	   if	   in	   the	  concept	  of	   comprehension	  we	   include	   the	  aes-­‐
thetic	   judgments	   that	  accompany	   their	   reception,	   at	   this	   level	   it	  would	   seem	  not	  only	  
opportune	  but	  necessary	  to	  acknowledge	  the	  constitutive	  value	  of	   language	  games.	  As	  
has	  been	  stressed	  (see	  in	  particular	  the	  clear	  analysis	  of	  Michaud	  [1999]),	  for	  an	  appre-­‐
ciation	   to	   become	   a	   judgment,	   it	   is	   necessary	   to	   enter	   into	   the	   sphere	   of	   the	   specific	  
ways	  of	  expression	  that	  we	  can	  imagine	  to	  be	  shared	  by	  a	  group	  or	  community	  of	  music	  
lovers.	  To	  formulate	  an	  aesthetic	   judgment	  about	  a	  rap	  or	  pop	  song	  by	  using	  language	  
games	  belonging	  to	  the	  presentation	  of	  the	  music	  of	  Max	  Reger	  not	  only	  seems	  out	  of	  
place,	  but	  would	  most	  likely	  be	  considered	  an	  indication	  of	  misunderstanding.	  	  
It	  would	  be	  opportune	  to	  reflect,	  on	  this	  level,	  on	  the	  plurality	  and	  the	  variability	  that	  
is	   implicit	   in	   the	   concept	   at	   hand.	   Not	   only	   are	   there	   numerous	   language	   games,	   but	  
their	  efficacy	  varies	  with	  time:	  as	  pointed	  out	  by	  Wittgenstein	  (Wittgenstein	  [1953]:	  §23	  
(Wittgenstein	   [2009]:	   14	   s.)),	   while	   some	   get	   old	   and	   lose	   their	   function,	   others	   arise	  
from	  new	  practices	  and	  forms	  of	  life	  (we	  might	  think	  of	  the	  entire	  universe	  of	  music	  cre-­‐
ated	  by	  technology	  or	  made	  in	  order	  to	  be	  diffused	  on	  the	  web).	  It	  is	  especially	  thanks	  to	  
them	   that	   it	   is	   possible	   to	   confirm	   our	   understanding	   of	   different	   genres,	   styles,	   lan-­‐
guages	  or	  forms	  of	  expression	  that	  we	  might	  encounter	  in	  the	  current	  world	  of	  music.	  	  
6.	  Conclusion	  
Let	   us	   attempt	   to	   summarize	   the	  meaning	   that	   language	   games	   assume	   in	   relation	   to	  
musical	  understanding.	  We	  have	  stated	  that	  they	  serve	  as	  an	  instrument	  for	  testing	  the	  
discourse	  we	  use	  to	  describe	  music	  and	  the	  way	  we	  experience	  it.	  Moreover,	  they	  rep-­‐
resent	  one	  of	  the	  possible	  responses	  to	  the	  musical	  object,	  allowing	  a	  (third)	  person	  to	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exhibit	  the	  comprehension	  of	  it.	  While	  it	  is	  still	  a	  stretch	  to	  say	  that	  they	  constitute	  mu-­‐
sical	  understanding,	  it	  is	  legitimate	  to	  confirm	  that	  they	  support	  it	  and	  guide	  it.	  In	  order	  
to	  explain	  what	  this	  consists	  of	  it	  would	  be	  opportune	  to	  make	  reference	  to	  its	  ability	  to	  
correspond	  to	  music	  games.	  We	  must	  keep	  in	  mind	  that	  the	  concept	  of	  understanding	  
involves	  different	  uses,	  gradations	  and	  objects:	  while	  strictly	  speaking	   it	  coincides	  with	  
an	  aspectual	  perception	  related	  to	  a	  music	  game,	  in	  a	  broader	  sense,	  including	  the	  spe-­‐
cific	   type	  of	   response	  that	  are	  aesthetic	   judgments,	  comprehension	  can	  be	  considered	  
to	  be	   structured	  based	  on	   specific	   language	  games	   that	  are	   related	   to	   the	  diversity	  of	  
objects.	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